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Abstract 
 
Austria has experienced one of the steepest declines in the wage share in comparison to other European 
countries with a fall from 66.2% in its peak in 1978 to 52.8% in 2007 before the recession, and as of 
2015 with a level of 55.5% it is 10.6%-point below its peak. We find that union density has had the 
strongest impact in Austria, explaining 85.1 percent of the average decline of the wage share (based on 
our estimations for the period of during 1996-2007). We also find a sizeable negative effect of 
intermediate imports (international outsourcing) and some negative effect of outward FDI as well as 
financialisation measured by household debt and financial payments (interest and dividend payments 
and income as a ratio to total resources of nonfinancial corporations). The negative impact of technology 
(measured by ICT capital intensity as a ratio to value added in the sector) is relatively smaller and not 
always significant. Results indicate that migration has had a very strong positive effect on the wage 
share. Increasing imports of capital and consumption goods have also had sizeable positive effects. The 
strategy of an equality-led development requires labour market policies aiming at pre-distribution as 
well as redistribution. These include strengthening the bargaining power of labour, ensuring higher 
collective bargaining coverage, enforcing gender equality, introducing and enforcing pay ratios to 
moderate wage inequality, and restoring the progressivity of the tax system. 
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There has been a significant decline in the share of wages in GDP in both developed and developing 
countries since the 1980s. In a recent research paper (Guschanski and Onaran, 2016), we analyse the 
determinants of the wage share (adjusted labour compensation as a ratio to value added) for Austria and 
selected OECD countries.    
We use sector-level data of nine OECD countries (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, Sweden, the UK, the US) for the period of 1970 to 2011, which allows us to trace the 
developments in the wage share across high and low skilled sectors and within manufacturing and 
service industries.   
Our findings lend strong support to the political economy approach to functional income 
distribution. The fall in the wage share is significantly driven by various variables reflecting the 
bargaining power of labour, in particular union density.   
We find that globalisation had a strong impact on the wage share in all countries. In Austria, 
Germany, and to a lesser extent in the UK, the effect is due to outward FDI and intermediate import 
penetration which reflects the impact of international outsourcing practices.  
Financialisation had the most pronounced effects in Austria, the UK and the US, while it appears 
to be also relevant in Germany.  
We also find some evidence of a negative effect of personal income inequality on the wage share 
in Austria, Germany, the UK and the US.  
Interestingly the impact of technological change, which has been the usual suspect of mainstream 
explanations of rising inequality, does not have a robust effect when other variables are controlled for. 
Whenever there is some evidence of a negative impact in some specifications in Austria, Italy, and the 
US, the effect is smaller than that of union density, globalisation or financialisation. 
Austria has experienced one of the steepest declines in the wage share in comparison to other 
European countries with a fall from 66.2% in its peak in 1978 to 52.8% in 2007 before the recession, 
and as of 2015 with a level of 55.5% it is 10.6%-point below its peak.  We find that union density has 
had the strongest impact in Austria, explaining 85.1 percent of the average decline of the wage share 
(based on our estimations for the period of during 1996-2007). We also find a sizeable negative effect 
of intermediate imports (international outsourcing) and some negative effect of outward FDI as well as 
financialization measured by household debt and financial payments (interest and dividend payments 
and income as a ratio to total resources of nonfinancial corporations). The negative impact of technology 
(measured by ICT capital intensity as a ratio to value added in the sector) is relatively smaller and not 
always significant.   Results indicate that migration has had a very strong positive effect on the wage 
share. Increasing imports of capital and consumption goods have also had sizeable positive effects.  
To sum up, our research shows that inequality in Austria increased because of the increased 
fallback options of capital related to increased capital mobility in the form of outsourcing, FDI and 
financialisation and declining fallback options of labour related to the decline in collective bargaining 
power rather than an unavoidable outcome of technological change. Labour mobility (the share of 
migrant workers in total employment) does not have a negative impact on the share of wages in total 
income even in the service sectors predominantly hiring low-skilled labour.  
The fall in the wage share has been a deliberate outcome of policies which have led to the vicious 
circle of rising inequality, financialisation, chronically low demand, a slowdown in investment  and 
growth both in Austria and Europe (Tori and Onaran, 2015; Onaran and Obst, 2015). 
  Negative effects of openness or global integration are not an unavoidable destiny, rather an 
outcome of the current domestic and international policies. Openness and regional integration can also 
be managed in a way to benefit both the richer and poorer partners if trade and investment flows are 
designed as part of an egalitarian and growth-oriented international economic policy. In an alternative 
economy where the balance of power shifts in favour of labour and unions have a strong voice, if 
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migrants come to work, it is possible to set the terms and conditions under which they work by the local 
workforce.  In the European context, progressive movements have more common ground than they 
currently exploit. There is scope for international cooperation, in case the coordination failure can be 
overcome.   
The empirical evidence shows that to break this vicious circle we need alternative economic 
policies based on a coordinated policy mix of equality-led development and public investment. Onaran 
and Obst (2015) provide strong empirical evidence to reject the myth that we cannot have pro-labour 
policies in the age of globalisation. Austria as part of Europe as a whole is strong enough to pursue an 
egalitarian, wage-led growth strategy and would benefit from a coordinated boost to the wage share. As 
such, Austria and other countries in Europe could, and should, take a step forward in terms of radically 
reversing the fall in the wage share globally.   
The strategy of a wage-led development requires labour market policies aiming at pre-
distribution as well as redistribution. These include strengthening the bargaining power of labour, 
ensuring higher collective bargaining coverage, enforcing gender equality, introducing and enforcing 
pay ratios to moderate wage inequality, and restoring the progressivity of the tax system. Furthermore, 
income distribution policies need to be embedded into a broader macroeconomic and industrial policy 
mix targeting equality, full employment, and ecological sustainability. This requires regulating finance 
and the corporate governance of corporations, taming capital mobility, and implementing a public 
investment programme centred on substantial public investment in green physical infrastructure in 
renewable energy, public transport and housing and social infrastructure in care, education, and health. 
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